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amor de cosmos
Oct 24, 2013, 5:20 PM
The Unique Genius of Hong Kong's Public Transportation System
The use of a clever financing system has enabled the territory to provide world-class service—without breaking the bank.
Neil Padukone Sep 10 2013, 1:12 PM ET

New Yorkers are famous for complaining about the city's subway: despite an ever-increasing rise in fares, service never seems to get any better. And even still, ticket-sales still only funds part of the New York City subway system; the city still relies on supplementary taxes and government grants to keep trains running, as fares only cover about 45 percent of the day-to-day operating costs. Capital costs (system expansions, upgrades, and repairs) are an entirely different question, and require more state and federal grants as well as capital market bonds. And New York’s system is not unique: as in other cities, New York struggles to pay existing expenses and must go into debt to pay for upgrades, that is, without raising prices.

Is this problem intractable? Not exactly. Take Hong Kong for example: The Mass Transit Railway (MTR) Corporation, which manages the subway and bus systems on Hong Kong Island and, since 2006, in the northern part of Kowloon, is considered the gold standard for transit management worldwide. In 2012, the MTR produced revenue of 36 billion Hong Kong Dollars (about U.S $5 billion)—turning a profit of $2 billion in the process. Most impressively, the farebox recovery ratio (the percentage of operational costs covered by fares) for the system was 185 percent, the world's highest. Worldwide, these numbers are practically unheard of—the next highest urban ratio, Singapore, is a mere 125 percent.



Like no other system in the world, the MTR understands the monetary value of urban density—in other words, what economists call "agglomeration.” Hong Kong is one of the world’s densest cities, and businesses depend on the metro to ferry customers from one side of the territory to another. As a result, the MTR strikes a bargain with shop owners: In exchange for transporting customers, the transit agency receives a cut of the mall’s profit, signs a co-ownership agreement, or accepts a percentage of property development fees. In many cases, the MTR owns the entire mall itself. The Hong Kong metro essentially functions as part of a vertically integrated business that, through a "rail plus property" model, controls both the means of transit and the places passengers visit upon departure. Two of the tallest skyscrapers in Hong Kong are MTR properties, as are many of the offices, malls, and residences next to every transit station (some of which even have direct underground connections to the train). Not to mention, all of the retail within subway stations, which themselves double as large shopping complexes, is leased from MTR.

The profits from these real estate ventures, as well as that 85 percent farebox surplus, subsidize transit development: proceeds pay for capital expansion as well as upgrades. The MTR’s financial largesse means that the transit system requires less maintenance and service interruptions, which in turn reduces operating costs, streamlines capital investments, and encourages more people to use transit to get around. And more customers means more money, even if fares are relatively cheap: most commutes fall between HK $4 and HK$20 (about 50 cents to $3), depending on distance. (In London, by comparison, a Tube journey can cost as much as $18). Fare increases in Hong Kong are limited by regulations linking fares to inflation and profits, and the territory’s government recently started giving a HK $600-per-month travel stipend to low-income households, defined as those earning less than HK $10,000 a month.



Still, value capture is a powerful idea for transit management. New York has tested the waters of this approach with its $2 billion 7-train extension to the Hudson Yards project, working with the state’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority and the project’s developers to fund the extension with property taxes from the newly served area. Dedicated taxes, too, serve a similar purpose. But fundamentally, Hong Kong’s metro succeeds because it understands that a subway system is more than just a means of transportation—it is also essential to the well-being of a city’s population and economy.
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/09/the-unique-genius-of-hong-kongs-public-transportation-system/279528/

M II A II R II K
Oct 25, 2013, 3:40 AM
To have a public transit system in the real estate business itself that ties transit expansion directly to it, as opposed to a politicians whim to fund some expansion through taxpayers money, and the private sector shows up after the fact having contributed nothing to the said transit expansion.

As for those who complain about the government picking winners and losers as it pertains to the real estate business, well maybe they would have a chance to build stuff that they ordinarily wouldn't have in the vicinity of new stations if it weren't for a system like that.

ssiguy
Oct 25, 2013, 4:16 AM
Hong Kong is a unique situation which few other places in the world have. It's population density is extremely high and is basically a city-state so there are no low density/rural areas needing funds for highways.

amor de cosmos
Oct 26, 2013, 1:41 AM
I knew I'd heard of this before:

The co-development of transit and suburbia finds its genesis not in Japan, but in America. A century ago, America's vast urban railway networks were built by entrepreneurs who packaged transit investments with real estate projects. Wealthy industrialists and oil barons gladly ventured into the risky business of building interurban rail lines in hopes of turning handsome profits from land sales. Early streetcar suburbs such as Shaker Heights, outside of Cleveland, and Scarsdale, north of Manhattan, owe their existence to these entreprenerial motives. In Japan, and especially the Tokyo metropolitan area, co-investment in railways and new towns is still commonly practiced today. The majority of suburban rail lines in greater Tokyo have been privately built, typically by large consortiums that bundle together transit and new town development. In the United States and much of the developed world, the model of publicly led transit and privately led land development has become the norm since the end of the World War II, with generally disappointing ridership results. Publicly built rail lines in suburban corridors where office parks, shopping malls, and tract housing can be reached only by car are frequent reminders that transit and real estate development have all too often been out of synch. Co-development might be an area where it is advisable to borrow from the past, encouraging entrepreneurs to link transit and real estate projects, just as they did in America a hundred years ago, and just as they currently do in Tokyo. -- Robert Cervero, The Transit Metropolis (http://books.google.ca/books?id=bLs3H_IWr3wC), p.181-182

This book also says Scandinavia & Singapore do this. Maybe it's not so unique after all. Seems like a huge waste to do it any other way.

Wizened Variations
Oct 26, 2013, 7:20 PM
I knew I'd heard of this before:



This book also says Scandinavia & Singapore do this. Maybe it's not so unique after all. Seems like a huge waste to do it any other way.

Part of the problem, IMO, lies in how difficult integrating private development can be with building steel rail or monorail public transport.

In some of the best US schemes, such as in the Denver metro area and the RTD Fastracks and earlier build outs, the commercial development is considered first, and, then the rail right-of-way is considered afterwards. A great example of this in Denver is the entire Denver Union Station complex development area where the entire (former) rail yard property was divvied up prior to right of way being finalized in the most transportation efficient manner. Another problem arises when large underdeveloped properties adjacent to stations on the rail spokes already built leading into downtown, are not well integrated into station access functions. Often, the full potential of stations are lost due to distances from the station to developments and the type of zoning near the station. The examples of this in Denver are countless- a few worth mentioning are The Orchard, Belleview, Lincoln, Red Rocks, and Southmoor Stations.

Almost none of the developments (with the ironic exclusion of the brilliant shoe horning of stub heavy and light rail lines connected by an underground bus station into a property broken into small pieces created as the result of property speculation), shows praiseworthy planning for long term, close in, integrated urban design.

I personally believe that low level personnel that have been involved have done an outstanding job. The problem, as usual, in Denver lies almost completely with a fairly small group of moneyed players who defined what was to be done, and, profited immensely from that work.

Until this aspect of private development changes and a Japanese like private/public/user partnership is instituted, all of our new light rail, commuter rail, higher speed rail, and, high speed rail government consortium build outs, I am afraid, will be doomed to result in system wide mediocrity.