[Bert]

I thought about the amenities perspective earlier as well, but I initially figured it wasn't much of a factor in marginal cost. Yet, obviously, with higher density, more amenities are required to maintain quality of life, so it too is a factor. At the same time though, amenities are bonused for already, and I understand the bonusing is determined in part by the scale of the amenity (though I could be wrong). So, I think that's why I excluded discussion of amenity bonusing before - amenities, although regulated, are already compensated for through relaxation of regulation, and so have negligible impact on restricting marginal cost from meeting marginal revenue compared to the supply caps imposed by building size limits.

I think what the paper and myself are trying to argue applies to a scenario where demand remains constant, since all external social costs of building would be covered by regulation, so more building wouldn't necessarily reduce demand. In contrast, it's the NIMBY-based over-regulation (i.e. view cones) and additional, non-regulated, socially irrational NIMBY opposition that we're talking about getting rid of, since it limits supply by more than a socially optimal amount (i.e. protecting mountain views isn't worth it, since, if it was, the market rates offered for views would be higher). This supply relief will obviously make things a little more affordable, but I don't think we'd see the big 32.5%+ difference in pricing as the paper states, especially in our market (with a higher construction cost-to-price ratio, and more legitimate need for regulation compared to what the authors accounted for in Manhattan in the paper).