Some occasional users are probably going to remain unaccounted-for, but it'd be nice to think that Presto could accommodate a range of users and fare levels. The whole point is to remove headaches, after all.
En route to LRT, there may be more pressing issues. In evaluating the cost-effectiveness of a system, you generally have to consider revenue passengers. The HSR estimates its transfer rate is between 30% (HSR historical estimates) and 56% (observed by IBI and detailed in
Exhibit 3-24 of its 2010 Operational Review).
At the time of that report, there were roughly 36,000 weekday boardings of the HSR on the B-Line routes. Even if you opt to factor in the HSR's transfer rate, you’re looking at slightly more than 25,000 daily revenue passengers. Early reports suggest LRT would need 40,000+ full-fare boardings per weekday in order to be viable; a consultants' report into the economics of Hamilton LRT projected a need for about 34,000 riders per weekday for the LRT line to break even on its operational costs. If transfer rate is 30% and the B-Line corridor boasts 25,000 revenue passengers, we would appear to be about two-thirds to three-quarters of the way there.
Even then, IBI has noted that the HSR’s average fare is 25% below its peer group average, so any performance metrics using a peer group metric (such as the Greater Golden Horseshoe Travel Forecasting Model) would presumably need to address this variation.
Calculations such as these are complicated by the fact that the HSR’s transfer rate estimate is system-wide, and the B-Line sees a high-than-average rate of transfers, this being the nature of a transit spine that connects a number of other transit nodes. A sizeable chunk of ridership along that line is also made up of students and U-Pass riders, whose fares occupy the lower strata of discounts, significantly below standard adult fare levels. U-Pass users still count as "revenue passengers", but it's unclear how to weigh them since they're free to ride ad infinitum at no additional cost and, conversely, revenue would accrue to the HSR even if they never took the bus.
A related unknown (at least unknown to me – I would welcome clarification if anyone has some to lend) is how B-Line rider revenue and service efficiency relates to the larger HSR. I assume that currently, revenues from the high-capacity, nearly fare-rational routes along the B-Line corridor go into a general revenue fund for the HSR. In any calculation that earmarks B-Line revenue for B-Line operational costs, that may no longer be the case.
Collectively, the B-Line routes that Metrolinx envisions being converted to LRT account for nearly half of the system’s total ridership. It’s probably not quite this neat, but let’s assume that because those lines serve nearly half of all HSR riders, they generate roughly half of all HSR revenue. With the arrival of LRT, those funds would no longer help underwrite low-performing routes. They would offset the LRT operating cost (eg. 300 local O&M jobs, a notable surge from the HSR’s company-wide staffing levels of 600) while the under-performing majority of HSR routes, many of which branch off the B-Line, would potentially experience new operational pressures as a result. It’s a tricky balance, and to be honest I don’t have a clear sense of where the HSR stands.
Going back to Presto, there is another concern expressed in the Auditor General's report that will be of interest to data wonks:
“…the transit agencies indicated to us that the system currently lacks back-end support for reporting and financial reconciliation of transactions. To obtain ridership information, many transit agencies have had to design their own programs for extracting information from a data dump provided by Presto. The transit agencies also indicated that they have little assurance that the system is capturing all riders who use their respective systems.”
Granted, even Presto's compromised data would be a quantum leap from the HSR’s current reality – barely-there ridership information that cannot adequately measure or accurately account for the varied cash fares, assorted passes and transfers that make up the bulk of its user base. How the City evaluates and verifies HSR performance metrics is anyone’s guess. One bright note: the Operational Review's comparison of HSR data to IBI findings (
Exhibit 3-24 again) revealed that HSR data underestimated revenue boardings by 8%.