Horus, Good questions...
Quote:
Originally Posted by Horus
MOOSE gets payment in the form of "Stopping Fees" from each station (let's call them Station Partners). In return, MOOSE provides the means by which rail service can be provided.
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Terminology here is important, because "partner" has a specific meaning in law. They are "units". Here's the relevant excerpt from the PPR white paper:
When a private- or public- sector property manager undertakes to transform a locality into a PPR “Linked Locality”, they may choose to structure their business relationships on a for-profit or not-for-profit basis upon any model they prefer in order to raise the funds required to cover the “train stopping fee”, the costs of developing and operating the station, various taxes, and a reserve fund. However the logical structure which most directly aligns with the PPR business dynamic is the "common elements freehold condominium". The seminal work describing adaptation of a condominium legal framework to commercial and industrial contexts was the 1974 paper by Charles A. Goldstein et.al. entitled “Commercial and Industrial Condominiums: An Overall Analysis”. This was recently republished. (Goldstein, Lipson, Rohan, & Shapiro, 2012) Whereas the term "condominium" is associated in most public discourse with urban residential high-rises, in fact it has also come to be a common ownership arrangement in industrial, commercial and multi-use contexts such as office buildings, industrial parks, shopping centres, and combination buildings that have offices or retail units on the lower floors, and residential units above. In rural areas, the condominium legal model is occasionally adapted for use amongst otherwise independent producers for the management of common irrigation, pastureland and animal shelters. This framework provides a useful default reference template for investors and developers, and it provides a practical set of assumptions for system modelling. However the legal structure of an industrial condominium brings with it a set of assumptions in law that do not fit the context of a train station, but the main features can be created in a joint use and maintenance agreement (JUMA), entirely under contract law. ...Amongst any and all station enterprises, the PPR formula for the train stopping fee remains the same generally-negotiated proportion of the marginal increase in real property income and asset value within a short walk of the station, approximating a 0.8 km radius. Increased rent/lease values provide a predictable monthly revenue stream linked to demand. And, increased asset values are realized as a percentage upon each sale, which has a predictable turnover rate in most markets.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Horus
How is the train service schedule determined? What about the frequency of service?
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That will be modelled in collaboration with
Railterm, which handles dispatch for both VIA and OC-Transpo.
Also, we'll use
MATsim, with a new module we'll add for property value optimization. That will help us target the optimal frequency.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Horus
How are fares established? Does MOOSE set the fares, or the Station Partners?
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Also, from the white paper:
In principle, passenger fares in PPR business strategy would be calibrated to whatever level optimizes sustained marginal increases in real property income and realized asset values for participating owners of property around stations. The incentive structure is drawn towards maximizing property demand and market price by minimizing fares and optimizing passenger experience. ... It is useful to consider how systems planners should respond if the an incentive based on driving up demand for property near stations indicates that the optimal passenger fare should be so low that it approaches the cost of collection and enforcement operations. Once these two factors approach each other, one may logically shift to a free or “pay what you want” relationship with passengers (Kim, Natter, & Spann, 2009) (Schons et al., 2014) (Schmidt, Spann, & Zeithammer, 2014) (Gomez & Krishnamurthy, n.d.). Moreover, it must be asked whether any foregone fare revenue would be more than offset by aggregate property revenues increases due to the overall market attractiveness of pay-what-you-want mobility. The perception goal for propertied interests near stations is to have passenger fares so low that drivers feel silly driving and parking a cars to get around a metropolitan region. Such a radical approach would not only get routine drivers out of their cars, but the business model itself may turn heads and gain a following. Property income and asset value near stations is optimized when “my next car's a train” becomes a popular refrain.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Horus
Do Station Partners have the ability to create revenue tools (Paid parking, in-station amenities) and if so, are the revenue tools subject to any approval by MOOSE?
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Yes they can, and yes, some constraints will apply, as is normal in any industrial/commercial condominium agreement.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Horus
Do existing Station Partners have rights with respect to the addition of new Station Partners on their lines?
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Yes. Once the whole thing is modelled, there will be an optimal number of stations. Too many stations will slow down the service. Just enough stations will give the "catchment area" maximum utility. New stations will be assessed by their proponents on their own merits, and by the incumbent stations in terms of their aggregate system-level effects. They have different but complementary perspectives.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Horus
What ridership level is expected from such small population centres? Are fares expected to offset operational costs?
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The PPR income stream does not depend on public sector subsidies or on passenger fares. Suppose, hypothetically that the NCC held a parcel of semi-wilderness land with no residential or commercial tenants, and they wanted a MOOSE station to support public access. Under the PPR model they would get an independent land evaluation as if they were preparing to sell it (which they are not doing,
but they could). Their subscription fee for train service would be based on the new independent land evaluation once the station is operating. For "greenfield" wilderness, you might think, the increment is not so great. Maybe not. But taking a system-level view, what all the other stations now obtain is a new NCC station with direct easy access to that semi-wilderness location. Run the independently peer-reviewed statistical model to get the distributed value effects, and that's the financial benefit to consider. So the fee that the NCC would pay based on their own increment might be quite affordable for them, and yet may be just a tiny fraction of the aggregate value increment realized
for the system as a whole.
The point of this being, that while population density is one of the factors in play, it's not the only factor, and in some station contexts, such as the hypothetical example above, it's precisely the lack of any population at that station which is the source of its value.
Joseph Potvin
Director General | Directeur général
Moose Consortium (Mobility Ottawa-Outaouais: Systems & Enterprises) |
www.letsgomoose.com
Consortium Moose (Mobilité Outaouais-Ottawa: Systèmes & Enterprises) |
www.onyvamoose.com
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